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ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE BRIC COUNTRIES
Dr. Walter Molano*

INTRODUCTION

The world as a whole is currently facing an economic downturn that
some feel would drag the U.S. and the rest of the world into a deep economic
depression. The affected countries are undergoing a credit crisis that has now
resulted in an economic crisis of gigantic proportions. The mess caused by fastand-loose mortgage lending in the U.S. has now blown into a perilous global
crisis of confidence that has revealed both the scale and the limitations of
globalization. Linked together in an increasingly tattered web of loans, banks
around the world have dragged one another down. At the root of the troubles
are the toxic assets, that is, the highly leveraged securities mainly linked to U.S.
mortgages that banks around the world still have on their books.
The financial crisis engulfing both the developed and developing
countries is raising the specter of market panic and even social unrest. The list
of countries under threat is growing by the day, and now includes such
emerging market stalwarts as Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.
They have become collaterally damaged in a crisis that began in the American
subprime market. Analysts in all comers of the world simply missed the boat
when it came to the current crisis. No one was able to tell the extent, timing,
and breadth of the collapse.
It was expected that the self correcting powers of the free markets
would somehow manage to steady the economies and avert a catastrophe. But,
this did not happen; the problem was too vast and too complex for the market
forces to correct something that is beyond correction. The self-correcting
market forces had failed to anticipate the self-destructive power of wanton
mortgage lending.
The fast growing economies of the world depend on money from
Western banks to build factories, buy machinery and export goods to the United
States and Europe. When those banks stop lending and the money dries up, as it
has in recent months, investor confidence vanishes and the countries suddenly
find themselves in crisis.
* Dr. Walter Molano is the Head of Research at BCP Securities LLC., in Greenwich, CT. This
article is based on the BCP's Weekly Emerging Market Advisor.
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The break-down of the credit markets has triggered fear and
uncertainty across financial markets the world over. The crisis has triggered a
profound liquidity crunch not just among vehicles supporting mortgage debt,
but across a wide array of asset classes. Mortgage lenders are not lending at fair
and logical rates even to prime borrowers.
In normal times, problems in the economy cause problems in the
financial markets because hard-pressed consumers and businesses have trouble
repaying their loans. But this time, the problems in the financial markets are
slowing the economy. If the economy continues to spiral down, that could
cause a second dip in the financial system.
The global economy is undergoing a gut wrenching deleveraging
process. The desire by policymakers and central bankers to destroy savings
through the debasement of money is manifesting itself into a massive
destruction of capital. Given the dearth of liquidity, even defensive strategies
can be hyperactive trading strategies. Following is a brief exposition of the
economic crisis as it relates to Brazil, China, India, and Russia (BRIC countries)
that were until recently models of economic growth and stability.
I. THE BRIC COUNTRIES
Brazil, China, India, and Russia (BRIC) were collectively one of the
strongest economies of the world, with growth rates that were higher than the
well established industrial countries of Europe, Japan, and the U.S. For
example, between 2002 and 2008, China's economy grew on an average of 10
percent per year. Similarly, India's economy grew by an average of 8 percent
per year. But, the recent economic crisis that is fanning the world has also
affected these high flying four economies with potential to derail their
phenomenal resurgence in the world economic order.
A. Brazil
Brazil, part of the high flying BRIC economies had a robust five year
average growth of 4.6 percent, a substantial flow of foreign capital of 328
billion and a surplus in its current account balance (Table l). The globalization
and its resulting decoupling of the economies were supposed to protect
countries in regions that did not create or participate in the economic downturn
and, hence, continue their drive for economic sustainability. But, Brazil's
economic data released in February confirmed that decoupling was just another
myth. Indeed, the Brazilian economy hit the proverbial BRIC wall, with
industrial production plunging 14.5 percent. This was in addition to dropping
6.4 percent in November. Manufacturing and white goods were the hardest hit,
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as banks curtailed credit facilities.
Brazil, despite having modernized its economy with trade
liberalization and high capital flows, has plunged into an economic crisis that
might be difficult for it to extricate itself from 1 (http://www.twnside.org, 2009).
Even though the Brazilian economy is considered to be a relatively closed
economy, the downturn in global demand has had a devastating effect on
industrial output, and this is rippling throughout the rest of the economy.
For the first time in more than seven years, Brazil has posted a trade
deficit. Exports plunged 29 percent in January, posting a shortfall of $518
million. In contrast, Brazil at the end of 2008 reported a $2.3 billion trade
surplus. Exports to the U.S. have dropped by 36 percent and embarkations to
the European Union fell 27.4 percent. If the current trend continues, Brazil is
expected to report a current account deficit of $32.9 billion by the end of 2009
and will probably face similar shortfalls until the economic crisis facing the
world is lifted.
Brazil and its citizens are expected to face difficult times as companies
trim their expansion programs. In addition, the pre-salt offshore oil fields do
not look so promising now with crude oil prices hovering below the $40 barrel
mark. There is a general foreboding among business executives that the global
downturn will be long and hard. The economic crisis that is being felt in Brazil
is cutting a broad swath across all socio-economic classes. There is a dearth of
trade finance in Brazil, which is having a devastating effect on small producers.
For example, the fruit industry, concentrated in the northeastern region of the
country, has seen a decline in exports by more than a third as small exporters
cannot get the credit to ship their produce. This slowdown in fruit production
and exports has forced many of these farmers and small businesses to furlough

20,000 workers in one of the poorest regions of the country.
To compound the problem facing Brazilian policymakers, there is a
looming stock of consumer debt. Because of the growing economy and
consumer spending, consumer credit was on a tear for the last five years,
expanding at an annual rate of 20% per year. Therefore, it is not surprising to
see non-performing loans rise as the economy decelerates. Brazilian banks and
financial institutions have also practiced their version of subprime lending in the
form of automobile loans that are risky at best. The banks have given very
generous terms to people who were not qualified to take such large obligations,
sometimes for terms that go beyond the useful life of the automobile. In hard
times, people tend to default on loans, and banks hold vast non-performing
portfolios.

1 Michael Bailey & Heinz Stecher, The Brazilian economic crisis (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/brazil-cn.htm.
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Brazil with its closed economy was expected to weather the
international storm, but is now facing the grim realities of globalization. The
forecast for the Brazilian economy for the near future is a contraction in almost
all sectors of the economy. Unless the policymakers act aggressively by
tightening budgets and bailing out some of the financial institutions, the
prospect for Brazil is dim. Critical public works projects to modernize the
economy are being delayed, further compounding the crisis 2 (Kraul, 2008). The
effects of European and U.S. governments stabilization initiatives are not going
to trickle down to Brazil until these economies themselves come out of a
tailspin that many economists predict will take years to materialize.
Table 1
Selective Economic Data for Brazil (2002-2008)
Variables

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
Estimate
10

Exports (% of 14
15
16
15
15
13
GDP)
External
debt 230
234
219
187
194
229.4 236.6
(000,000
current US$)
FDI Net flows 100.9 132.8 161.3 195.6 236.2 328.5 345.6
(000,000
of current US$)
GDP
Growth 3
1
6
3
4
5
5.2
rate (%)
Imports (% of 13
12
12
12
12
11
9
GDP)
Inflation (%)
16
14
8
8
4
4
5.8
Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query , March, 2009
http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/html,
March, 2009
http://unctad.org/templates/startpage.asp/, March, 2009
B. China

Among the BRIC group of countries, China had the most vibrant
economy with a GDP growth rate averaging over 10 percent, a large trade

2 Chris Kraul, Economic Crisis Hits as Brazil Builds, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 27, 2008, at C1.
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balance with the rest of the world, and FDI flows averaging $250 billion for the
past five years (Table 2). Additionally, China had about $2 trillion in foreign
exchange reserves. But, the economic crisis that is engulfing the world has also
affected this once powerful economic behemoth. The belief that China would
lead us out of the morass has proven false. Indeed, the Asian economies have
turned out to be the least resilient. Their open structures have been immediately
impacted by the contraction in U.S. demand and the collapse of trade finance.
Their export-led growth models withered a drop from 37 percent of GDP in
2007 to an estimated rate of 19 percent in 2008 (See table 2), posting dramatic
declines in economic activity. For example, China's electricity demand
dropped 9.3 percent in December and imports plunged more than 20 percent,
suggesting contraction in total output.
China's economy is growing at its slowest pace in five years, from an
average growth rate of over 10 percent for the previous decade to under 10
percent for the year 2008. China's industrial production growth for September
slowed to 11.4 percent, the lowest in several years3 (Schearf, 2008). The
quarterly economic growth was the weakest since 2003, when China was hit by
the SARS outbreak. Many of Chinese leaders and some leading economists
agree that the global financial crisis is largely to blame for the current
downturn.
It was not surprising for many of the leading economists that China
faltered in spite of its stellar economic performance over the past decade.
Given the high level of dependence on exports, China's economy could not
escape the impact of the global slowdown. After 30 years of fast growth,
China's investment-driven and export-oriented development model, with
exports accounting for close to 40 percent of GDP, had become increasingly
difficult to sustain 4 (Chen, 2008). For example, China's auto export declined by
22.18 percent in August alone and has continued to decline since 5(Xu, 2008)
The current situation has also cast a doubt on China's long-term
economic growth, as it is so closely tied to the rest of the world. Policy makers
and government leaders are trying to bail out many sectors and build
infrastructure by infusing capital into the system. This alone is not expected to
propel the economy on the way to recovery. The massive lay offs in the
manufacturing sector, coupled with a weak financial structure, are definitely
going to create economic chaos for the Chinese economy during foreseeable

3 Daniel Schearf, Global FinancialCrisisDrops China'sEconomic Growth to Slowest Pace in Five

Years, Voice of America News, Oct. 20, 2008, at 1.
4 Zhiwa Chen, Economic Crisis Could Push Reform in China (Mar. 4, 2009), available at

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id.
5 Shenglan Xu, FinancialCrisisHits China'sAuto Exports, China Daily, Oct.15, 2008, at 1.
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future. It is believed that the current crisis might be an impetus for Chinese
leaders to introduce some badly needed reforms into the Chinese economy.
These reforms include promoting land-use rights, subsidizing education, and
development of a mechanism to distribute wealth much more widely and
evenly.
Table 2
Selective Economic Data for China (2002-2008)
Variables

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
Estimate
19

Exports (% of 25
30
34
37
40
37
GDP)
External
debt 186.1 208.0 247.0 281.0 322.0 373.6 420.8
(000,000
current US$)
FDI Net flows 216.5 228.4 245.5 292.1 292.6 327.1 (000,000
of current US$)
GDP
Growth 9
10
10
10
12
12
9.8
rate (%)
Imports (% of 23
27
31
32
32
15
GDP)
Inflation (%)
1
3
7
9
10
16
6
Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query , March, 2009
http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/html,
March, 2009
http://unctad.org/templates/startpage.asp/, March, 2009
C. India

India, with its thriving middle class and consumption driven economy,
was considered a model economy that has had phenomenal economic success
with its technology and software related exports. Through liberalization
initiatives and opening of the country for foreign investors, India had gained
considerable economic stability that was unthinkable just two decades ago. By
encouraging FDI flows and holding inflation under 6 percent, India's annual
average GDP growth rate was just under 10 percent (Table 3).
India's economy grew at its slowest pace in nearly six years in the
third and fourth quarters of 2008 as the Asian giant started to feel the full brunt
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of the deepening global downturn 6 ("India's Economy Suffers Sharp
Slowdown", 2009). The economy grew by 5.3 percent, down from 8.9 percent
a year earlier. Even with this slowdown, the mood in the country and among its
leaders is a sense of resiliency. While most of the world grapples with a
crippling financial crisis and a recession, optimism reigns in much of India as
its economy continues to grow albeit at lower rate7 (Timmons, 2009).
Compared to the rest of the world, India's economy remains robust and
its chances of weathering the current crisis are high. Thanks to its rigid banking
policies, the slow grinding bureaucratic process and its protectionist policies,
India seems to be insulated from the global recession and economic crisis faced
by many countries of the world. The conservative approach taken by regulators
and policy makers, at its banking and financial institutions has safeguarded the
financial sectors from the upheavals of mortgage backed securities and other
instruments of high risk and volatility. Moreover, the state dominated financial
system is virtually unconnected to foreign markets.
India's exports to the rest of the world are relatively low. Being
largely a domestic economy with exports including software at around 17% of
GDP, India is relatively insulated from foreign economic turmoil 8(Malkani,
2008). Whereas, China and Russia, two large countries like India boast of
exports as a percentage of GDP in the range of 30 to 40 percent, India's exports
are under 20 percent of its GDP (Table 3). In addition, other economic
indicators have remained relatively stable - inflation is under 8 percent and
growth for the year is estimated to be above 7 percent. India's banks are much
stronger in capitalization than many European and U.S. banks. For example,
the market capitalization of State Bank of India recently surpassed that of
Citigroup.
In spite of India's relative stability, there are some troubling signs for
the country. The government deficit as a percentage of GDP will probably
double to 11.4 percent, and Standard & Poor's revised the outlook for Indian
long-term sovereign debt from stable to negative. It is also possible that the
country would receive lower remittances from abroad as the economies of some
of the Middle East countries cool. Remittances by Indian's working in the
Middle East not only add to the country's foreign reserves but also provide
consumption expenditures for many families that depended on these
remittances.

6 India's Economy Suffers Sharp Slowdown, Times of India, Feb. 27, 2009, pp 1-3.
7 Heather Timmons, India Maintains Its Sense of Optimism and Growth, The New York Times,
Mar. 2, 2009, at B 1-B4.
8 Rohibi Malkani, Will Financial Crisis Derail India's Economy?, The Economic Times, Sept. 23.
2008, pp 1 -3 .
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Overall, the prognosis for India is good. With the stability in its
financial sector, demand for its technology outsourcing services, high savings
rates, and foreign investor's confidence in its economy, India is expected to
turnaround much faster than many other countries. According to Palaniappan
Chidambaram, India's Finance Minister, India will not face an economic
meltdown as the fundamentals of the Indian economic system are sound 9
(Chidambaram, 2008). India's economy is expected to grow in the range of 5 to
7 percent for this coming year.
Table 3
Selective Economic Data for India (2002-2008)
Variables
Exports (%
of GDP)
External
debt
(Current
US$)
FDI
Net
flows
(000,000
of current
US$)
GDP
Growth rate

2002
14

2003
15

2004
18

2005
20

2006
22

2007
21

2008Estimate
11

105

112

124

123

153

201.4

163.8

25.4

31.2

38.2

44.6

52.4

76.3

142.9

4

8

8

9

10

9

7.3

(%)__

Imports (% 15
16
20
23
25
24
9
of GDP)
Inflation
4
4
6
4
6
4
7.8
(% )
I_
_
Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query , March, 2009
http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/html,
March, 2009
http://unctad.org/templates/startpage.asp/, March, 2009

9 P. Chidamabaram, India's Economy is Capable to Weather Financial Crisis, The Economic
Times, Oct. 9, 2008, at P1.
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D. Russia
For the last five years, Russia was one of the shining stars of the
emerging markets, with huge current account surpluses, massive capital flows,
and towering international reserves (Table 4). Its geographic location astride
the Eurasian land mass left it well-prepared to cater to the fastest growing
markets on the planet. With its vast natural resources, well-educated workforce
and treasure-trove of financial resources Russia became the envy of the world.
The Russian markets held up well, initially withstanding the credit
crunch that was savaging much of Europe and North America. But, the wheels
began coming off the Russian behemoth during the third quarter of last year,
and, now it finds itself in a mess similar to the one it faced in 1998. A problem
faced by Russia is its reliance on commodities to drive its economy. Despite
Moscow's attempt to move the economy up the value-added chain, it is still
based on commodities. Energy and metals remain the dominant sectors of the
economy. Therefore, the collapse in commodity prices was a devastating blow
for Russia.
Furthermore, Russia is still mired in its central planning mode of the
past. The state plays a domineering role. Its leadership converted many of the
previously privatized companies back into the arms of the state. As a result, the
state became the main driver of economic activity. In short, Russia became a
mixed economy with most of the largest and powerful companies owned by the
state, and the small and medium-sized companies owned by the private sector.
This resulted in a change in the national incentive structure, where the brightest
and ambitious graduates of prestigious universities headed to state owned
enterprises leaving a lack of talent for the small and medium-sized companies.
In addition, corruption has been on the rise further eroding the confidence of the
people in the government and its bureaucrats. The result of the shift in private
sector, loss of talent pool and corruption is the creation of an inefficient system
that was hit hard when commodity prices declined.
All the above confluence of forces has left Russia with very few
options to tackle the current economic crisis. In addition, there is some
infighting going on among the Russia's inner circle of policy makers whose
incentives and benefits are being drastically cut back and, hence, their mind is
not on the country's problems but, on their own1° (Scott, 2009). In trying to
stem the economic crisis, Moscow tried various initiatives to provide rescue and
assistance programs which then reduced the incentive for the private sector to
make the painful adjustments needed to confront the global liquidity crisis. The
'0 Michael Scott, Fewer Economic Spoils Prompt Fight among the Elite, The Guardian, Mar. 4,
2009, at p1.
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problem is, as we now know, that all liquidity crises mutate into solvency crises
if left unattended. The government is also trying to stabilize the ruble so as not
be affected by the speculators who see an opportunity to gain from exchange
rate fluctuations '1 (O'Brien, 2009).
In light of the current crisis, Russia has been one of the biggest
disappointments considering its enviable economic position just a few years
ago. Having taken comfort in its massive reserves and huge current account
surpluses, no one imagined the rot that lurked below the surface. Unless
Russia's leaders use the current crisis as an opportunity to shift more of its
activities into the private sector, the checks and balances needed to keep some
of its instinctive behavior handed down over its long history of socialistic
leanings, the country is probably going to be economically handcuffed for the
foreseeable future.
Table 4
Selective Economic Data for Russia (2002-2008)
Variables

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
Estimate
21.4

Exports (% of 35
35
34
35
34
30
GDP)
External debt
147.3 175.6 196.7 229.0 251.0 356.5 527.1
(Current US$)
FDI Net flows 70.8
96.7
122.3 180.3 271.6 324.1 491.2
(000,000
of current US$)
GDP
Growth 5
7
7
6
7
8
6
rate (%)
Imports (% of 24
24
22
21
21
22
14
GDP)
Inflation (%)
6
14
20
19
16
14
13.9
Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query , March, 2009
http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/html,
March, 2009
http://unctad.org/templates/startpage.asp/, March, 2009

Emma O'Brien, Russia to Keep Ruble with Tight Band Survey Shows (Mar. 4, 2009), availableat
http://Blomberg.com.
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CONCLUSION

Brazil, China, India and Russia had achieved extraordinary economic
success through a well-planned economic program that was built on trade
liberalization, FDI flows, and domestic consumption. With a large population
base these countries were able to provide huge markets for both domestic and
foreign producers. It was expected that these four countries would continue
their economic growth patterns and be less vulnerable to the economic cycles
that often peril smaller countries. Then came the economic meltdown. The
economic crisis now engulfing the world has also affected these four countries
with a probable exception of India which seems to have the potential to weather
this storm.
The forecast for the BRIC countries is a slow economic recovery that
will place extra burden on its populations and cause severe contraction of the
economies. It is apparent that without strong policies and a generous stimulus
package, the countries of Brazil, China, India and Russia will see their
economies flounder in the short-term. China and Russia seem to have enough
reserves to implement stimulus packages that might help to elevate the problem.
But, for Brazil and India, with ballooning fiscal deficit, the governments of
these two countries cannot introduce any impact driving stimulus packages and
may have to rely on interest rate cuts to jumpstart the economy.
The economic recovery of the four BRIC countries is also to some
extent dependent on the recovery of the U.S. and other western European
countries that provide the export opportunities for these countries. The global
financial crisis, and subsequent economic slowdown, will continue to have a
negative effect on export growth for these countries. In the case of the U.S, its
recovery is very much tied to the success of the current economic stimulus
package and the way in which the rewards of the package are distributed. There
is a growing trend towards capital protectionism which if it does materialize
would allocate capital resources to domestic operations that in turn will force an
inefficient allocation of capital at a time of extreme scarcity. The global
economy needs to work through the cycle, thus permitting inventories and
capacity to deplete below demand, and sowing the seeds for an eventual
recovery.
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